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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
.AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
]

Di d the tria] cour t correctly refuse to give

defendant's proposed jury instructions regarding the elements of

to the tria 3 court's refusal to gi ve proposed jury instructions
presents a questi on of .31 aw wh i ch i s reviewed on appeal for

court's ruling.

State v. Mincv. 838 P. 2d 648 j (356: (If I ah , - - x

cert. denied^ 843 P 2d 1042 (Utah 1992); State .v,i Pedersen. 802
P.2d 1328, 1330 (U t: \ .1 i" ]: | • II S S '()), c ei: t
1991).

denied^ 815 P 2d 2-

Reversal is warranted only upon proof by defendan"

h

State v. Haston, 811 P.2d 929f 930-31 (Utah App- 1991), rev'd. on
other grounds, 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993); see also State v.
McCumber, 622 P.2d 353, 359 (Utah 1980), abrogated on other
grounds, State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991).
2.

Did the jury instructions improperly permit the

jury to convict defendant of attempting a reckless act?

This

Court need not address the merits of this issue as defendant has
not preserved the issue for appellate review.

Utah R. Crim. P.

19(c); State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah App. 1991);
State v. Becker, 803 P.2d 1290, 1293 (Utah App. 1990).

When

reviewing an allegation of instructional error for manifest
injustice where no objection was raised below, as provided in
rule 19(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, an appellate
court uses the same two-prong test used to identify the existence
of plain error under rule 103(d), Utah Rules of Evidence.
v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121-22 (Utah 1989).

State

First, the court

must determine from the record "'that it should have been obvious
to a trial court that it was committing error.'"

.Id. at 122

(quoting State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah 1987), cert.
denied^ 493 U.S. 814 (1989)); see also State v. Archambeau, 820
P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 1991).

Second, the error must be

harmful in that it affects the substantial rights of the accused.
Archambeau, 820 P.2d at 922; Verde, 770 P.2d at 122.

2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES A N D RULES
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§ 76-5-102 (Supj > 1 992)
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(a) an attempt, wi th unlawful force or violence,..
to do bodily injury to another;
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immedia I: „e
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(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or
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(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he
commits assault as defined in Section 76-5-102 and he:
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to
another; cr
(bj uses a dangerous weapon uo u e l i n e d in Sec
n
7 6-1-601 or other means or force likely to produce
death oi serious bodily i njury,
(2)

Aggravated assatil t i s a th I ::t:i el degree felony
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STATEMENT OF T H E CASE
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presentence report (R. 11),

and thereafter sentenced defendant to

serve no more than five years in the Utah State Prison, together
with a consecutive term not to exceed five years for use of a
firearm, and to pay restitution for the medical bills incurred by
the victim (R. 136-37).
Defendant challenges his conviction and sentence,
seeking a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
During April 1992, defendant, his wife, and their four
children lived in one side of a duplex in Salt Lake City, Utah
(R. 298, 383, 470, 496). Jesus Rodriguez was temporarily staying
with friends in the other side of the duplex (R. 298, 326, 397,
438-39, 496). Several individuals, including defendant,
testified at trial that shortly after midnight on April 21, 1992,
defendant, his wife, Jesus, and a fourth person, Rogellio
Quinones, were visiting and drinking beer in defendant's living
room when defendant shot Jesus with a shotgun (R. 298, 304-13,
331-33, 345, 353, 361, 364, 481-82, 504). The testimony varied
with respect to the factual details surrounding the shooting and
the motive behind it; however, the fact that defendant shot Jesus
was undisputed.
Defendant testified that Jesus got angry at him, called
defendant names, and then lunged toward defendant to grab the
shotgun he had been holding in his lap throughout Jesus' visit
(R. 507-10, 512-15, 535-36, 547). Based on these facts and a
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant's entire appeal is based on the premise that
the completed offense of assault, accomplished by means of Man
attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to
another" as defined in Utah Code Ann* § 76-5-102(1)(a) (Supp.
1992), requires an intentional mental state.

This Court need not

address the issue of the requisite mental state because even if
the trial court's refusal to give defendant's proposed
instructions on the issue constitutes error, the error was
harmless because, under the facts of this case, it is not likely
that the result would have been different had the proposed
instructions been given.

The evidence in this case provides no

factual basis on which the jury could have based its finding of
assault on the attempt section of the assault statute.

Moreover,

there is no factual basis on which the jury could base the
assault on a reckless mental state. Accordingly, any error in
the court's instruction regarding the mental state required for
an assault based on the attempt section of the assault statute
would be harmless.
This Court need not reach the merits of defendant's
claim that the jury instructions permitted the jury to convict
him of attempting a reckless act in violation of Utah law because
defendant failed to preserve the issue for appeal.

The manifest

injustice which may arise upon conviction of a non-existent crime
is absent here where, under the specific facts in this case, any
error in the jury instructions relating to the requisite mental
6

state for commission of assault by an attempt to inflict bodily
injury did not affect the substantial rights of defendant because
his conviction could not be premised either on the attempt
section of the assault statute or on a reckless mental state.
Consequently, defendant was not convicted of a non-existent
crime•
ARGUMENT
POINT I
EVEN IF THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO GIVE
DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS CONSTITUTED
ERROR, THE ERROR WAS HARMLESS WHERE, UNDER
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, DEFENDANT SUFFERED NO
PREJUDICE
A.

Introduction

Defendant contends that the trial court committed
reversible error when it refused to give two of his proposed jury
instructions concerning the elements of assault and aggravated
assault.

He argues that the elements instructions given to the

jury contained improper and inconsistent mental states which
permitted the jury to convict him of aggravated assault based
solely on a reckless mental state when the underlying offense of
assault, when accomplished by an attempt to do bodily injury,
required a finding that he possessed an intentional mental state
(Br. of App. at 5-8).
An allegation of error relating to the trial court's
refusal to give proposed jury instructions presents a question of
law which is reviewed on appeal for correctness with no deference
given to the trial court's ruling.

7

State v. Mincv, 838 P.2d 648,

658 (Utah App.), cert, denied 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992); State v.
Pedersen, 802 P.2d 1328, 1330 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied^ 815
P.2d 241 (Utah 1991).

Reversal is warranted only upon proof by

defendant of prejudice stemming from the instructions viewed in
the aggregate.

State v. Haston, 811 P.2d 929, 930-31 (Utah App.

1991), rev'd on other grounds, 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993); see
also State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353, 359 (Utah 1980), abrogated
on other grounds. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991).
B.

Challenged Instructions

The jury was instructed on the charged offense of
attempted criminal homicide as well as the lesser included
offense of aggravated assault, the latter of which is at issue on
appeal (R. 109-18).

Because aggravated assault requires a

preliminary finding of assault, the trial court gave the jury an
instruction relating to assault which reflected the statutory
language:
"Assault" is:
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence,
to do bodily injury to another; or
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate
force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; or
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or
violence, that causes bodily injury to another.
(R. 116, Instruction 24; a copy of the instruction is attached in
Addendum A ) .

See Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-102(1) (Supp. 1992).

Defendant verbally proposed that subsection (a) of the
instruction be revised to provide that the statute's use of the
term "attempt" required that it be an attempt "to intentionally
8

do" bodily injury to another (R. 567; a copy of the verbal
argument is attached in Addendum A) (emphasis added).1
The court also gave an instruction outlining the
elements required for aggravated assault, instructing that the
jury find each of the following:
1. That on or about the 21st day of April of 1992
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant
Francisco Tinoco assaulted Jesus Rodriguez; and
2. That he did so by the use of a dangerous
weapon or other means or force likely to produce death
or serious bodily injury;
3. That the said defendant did so recklessly,
intentionally or knowingly; and
4. That the defendant did so unlawfully and
without legal justification.
(R. 115, Instruction 23; a copy of the instruction is attached in
Addendum A ) . Use of the language in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this
instruction has been upheld.

See State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186,

191 (Utah 1988); State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 878 (Utah 1985).
Defendant proposed that paragraph three of the instruction be
modified to read
3. That the said defendant did so recklessly,
intentionally or knowingly, whichever is applicable.
(R. 567; Addendum A) (emphasis added).

He argued that the

additional language in both instructions was required to clarify
for the jury the need for an intentional mental state before they

1

The initial discussion of the jury instructions occurred off
the record. Defense counsel was later permitted to make a record
of her objections, but neither the prosecutor's argument nor the
details of the court's ruling were put on the record (R. 566-68).

9

could convict him of aggravated assault based on an attempt to do
bodily harm (R. 567-68; Addendum A ) .
C.

Argument

Defendant's appeal rests on his assertion that because
§ 76-5-102(1) specifically designates an attempt as one of three
methods for committing the crime of assault, the attempt must be
accompanied by an intentional mental state (Br. of App. at 6-7,
12).

He first argues that because the jury may have premised the

underlying assault on the "attempt" section of the statute, the
court's failure to instruct the jurors on the need for an
intentional mental state constitutes error (Td. at 6-7). He then
argues that because his conviction for aggravated assault may
have been based on a reckless mental state, and the jury was not
specifically instructed that assault committed by an attempt to
inflict bodily injury requires an intentional mental state, the
jury was allowed to convict him of the legal impossibility of
attempting a reckless act (.Id. at 11-12).

Both arguments rely on

the cases of State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843 (Utah 1992), and State
v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91 (Utah 1982), and the cases cited therein,
involving Utah's attempt statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101
(1990) (a copy is attached in Addendum B).
The jury was properly instructed that in order to
convict defendant of aggravated assault, it must first determine
that he committed an assault, then find as an aggravating
circumstance that he used "a dangerous weapon . . . or other
means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury"
10

as provided in the aggravated assault statute (R. 115,
Instruction No. 23; Addendum A). Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1)(b)
(1990).

By statute, the underlying assault may be committed by

(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence,
to do bodily injury to another;
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate
force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; or
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or
violence, that causes or creates a substantial risk of
bodily injury to another.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102(1) (Supp. 1992).
This jurisdiction has not explored the implications, if
any, of the Utah Supreme Court's interpretation of the mental
state required for application of Utah's attempt statute, § 76-4101, on offenses such as assault which, by statutory definition
independent of § 76-4-101, may be completed by means of an
attempt.

Although by statute § 76-4-101 would seem inapplicable

to the offense of assault, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 and §
76-4-301 (1990), an argument may be made that the Supreme Court's
construction of the attempt statute may be applicable to the
"attempt" component of the first variation of assault.2
2

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 provides:
[W]hen the definition of the offense does not
specify a culpable mental state and the
offense does not involve strict liability,
intent, knowledge, or recklessness shall
suffice to establish criminal responsibility.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-301 provides:
Whenever
any
offense
specifically
designates or defines an attempt or conspiracy
and provides a penalty for the attempt or
conspiracy other than provided in this
chapter, the specific offense shall prevail

11

See,

e.g., State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 449, 454 (Utah 1986) (implying,
but not deciding, that § 76-4-101 may impact on such statutorilydefined offenses despite § 76-2-102).

However, the issue need

not be reached in this case because even if the court's refusal
to give defendant's proposed jury instructions constitutes error,
the error was harmless in this instance where, under the facts of
this case, it is not likely that the result would have been
different had the proposed instructions been given.

See State v.

Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 653 (Utah 1989).
Although the jury instructions as given in this case
provided the jury with the option of finding that defendant
committed an assault by any of the three means outlined in
subsections (l)(a)-(c) of the statute, defendant's proposed
modifications of the court's instructions, and his entire brief
on appeal, relate solely to subsection (l)(a) of the assault
statute.

However, the jury could only have premised the assault

on "an act" as provided in subsection (l)(c) in light of the
evidence before it.

The fact that defendant shot Jesus with a

shotgun at close range was uncontested below; defendant, the
victim, and two eyewitnesses testified to the fact (R. 301, 31213, 337, 345, 365-66, 441, 489, 513, 547). Defendant admitted at
trial the elements of assault under subsection (l)(c); that he
shot the victim with a shotgun (R. 513, 515, 547), thereby
committing "an act, . . . with unlawful force or violence, that
cause[dj or create[d] a substantial risk of bodily injury to
over the provisions of this section [chapter].
12

another."
added).3

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102(1)(c) (Supp. 1992) (emphasis
He sought only to excuse his act on the basis of self-

defense (R. 512-15).

Where the record clearly provides no basis

on which the assault could be premised on "an attempt . . . to do
bodily injury to another" under § 76-5-102(1)(a), the trial
court's failure to more fully instruct the jury concerning this
inapplicable section of the statute would be, at most, harmless
error.

C£. State v. Jones, 734 P.2d 473, 476 (Utah 1987) (even

if inclusion of additional language in an instruction "would have
more accurately stated the elements[,]" the language was not
applicable to the facts of the case and its omission was, at
most, harmless error); also Velarde, 734 P.2d at 453 (defendant
was not entitled to have the jury instructed on simple assault
where he admitted at trial the elements of assault and aggravated
assault).

Given the facts and the evidence, the jury was

properly instructed on the applicable elements of assault, and
any error in the court's refusal to give the proposed
instructions concerning an inapplicable element would be
harmless.

See Haston. 811 P.2d at 930-31.

3

Defendant also freely admitted using the loaded shotgun to
inflict the bodily injury, thereby admitting the requisite
aggravating circumstance presented to the jury to establish the
offense of aggravated assault; "[use of] a dangerous weapon . . .
or other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily
injury." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1)(b) (1990); see Soeer, 750
P.2d at 191 (defendant's uncontroverted testimony that he choked
the victim until she almost passed out established aggravated
assault under subsection (l)(b)); Velarde, 734 P.2d at 453, 454
(defendant admitted that he committed aggravated assault when, in
addition to admitting conduct constituting an assault, he testified
that he used a club on the victim).
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Moreover, there is no factual basis in this case on
which the jury could find that the assault was committed with a
reckless mental state, thereby rendering harmless any error in
the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury that more than
reckless conduct was required.

While one may not be guilty of an

attempt to commit a crime if the completed crime requires a
reckless mental state, Vigil, 842 P.2d at 847-48; Howell, 649
P.2d at 94 n.l; State v. Norman, 580 P.2d 237, 239 (Utah 1978),
an attempt may occur where the completed crime requires
intentional or knowing conduct.

Vigil, 842 P.2d at 846, 848 n.5

(holding that the knowing mental state required for depraved
indifference homicide does not satisfy the mental state required
for an attempt, but providing that the requisite mental state is
provided by the "knowing formulation" for murder and aggravated
murder under §§ 76-5-202(1) and 76-5-203(1)(a)); Howell, 649 P.2d
at 94 n.l; Norman, 580 P.2d at 239-40.
In addition to the testimony from defendant, Jesus, and
the two eyewitnesses establishing that defendant shot Jesus,
supra, defendant freely admitted that he shot Jesus in the arm
because he did not want to shoot him in the body (R. 515).
Defendant testified that he and Jesus were unacquainted before
the day of the shooting (R. 496-97).

Defendant met Jesus,

Rogellio and another man outside his duplex in the early
afternoon of April 21 (R. 294-95, 322-23, 368-69, 471-73, 49798).

He testified that because Jesus, for no known reason, said

some "very ugly words" about him, made hand signals to one of the
14

other men and showed him two bullets, defendant went inside his
apartment and moved his shotgun from his bedroom to the living
room (R. 498-502, 521, 528). Later that day, defendant had
Rogellio over and, after spending a number of hours together at
defendant's apartment, Rogellio retrieved Jesus from the other
side of the duplex and brought him to defendant's apartment (R.
297, 299, 328, 359-60, 502). As Jesus entered, defendant picked
up the shotgun from under the sofa or against the wall (R. 507).
Despite his earlier fear of Jesus, the fact that he had never
spoken to Jesus before that day, and the fact that he believed
Jesus to be drunk, defendant did not object to the visitor but
gave him a beer and entertained him in his living room for half
an hour (R. 304-05, 334, 361, 477, 480, 490, 501-02, 511, 521).
Although there were no other guns in the room (R. 317, 385-87,
418, 493), defendant kept his loaded shotgun on his lap
throughout the discussion, once moving it temporarily to his side
when Jesus said he wanted to grab it, and unloading it and
reloading at least once (R. 306, 308, 355-56, 507-09, 523-25,
529).
Defendant testified that at some point, without
provocation, Jesus began calling him names and "getting upset"
with him (R. 509-12).

When Jesus stood up, defendant testified

that Jesus said, "[I]t's time. I had enough[,]" and that he
"looked like he was going to jump on [defendant]" (R. 512-13,
521-22, 539-40).

At that point defendant raised the loaded

shotgun from his lap, held the barrel approximately six inches
15

from Jesus' left arm and pulled the trigger (R. 514-15, 523,
539).

Defendant did not try to help Jesus after shooting him and

did not call for emergency help (R. 530). Instead, he took the
shell out of the gun, propped it against the living room wall,
and went upstairs to his bedroom where he was later found by the
investigating officers (R. 384-85, 391-92, 525-26).
This evidence, based on defendant's own testimony,
together with the jury's obvious rejection of defendant's selfdefense theory, reflects that defendant acted with more than a
reckless mental state, i^e., an intentional or knowing mental
state.

Hence, the finding of an assault, even if premised on the

attempt section of the statute, was supported by an appropriate
mental state, and it is unlikely that the result would have been
different had defendant's proposed instructions been given.
Accordingly, any error in the court's refusal to give the
proposed instructions would be harmless.

See Haston, 811 P.2d at

930-31.
POINT II
DEFENDANT FAILED TO PRESERVE HIS CONTENTION
THAT HE WAS CONVICTED OF A LEGALLY IMPOSSIBLE
OFFENSE, AND THE RECORD DOES NOT ESTABLISH
THE HARM NECESSARY TO REVERSE HIS CONVICTION
BASED ON MANIFEST INJUSTICE
Defendant argues that because aggravated assault may be
committed with a reckless mental state, and the jury was not
specifically instructed that assault committed by an attempt to
inflict bodily injury requires a different mental state (see
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Point I, supra), the jury was allowed to convict him of the legal
impossibility of attempting a reckless act (Br. of App. at 11).
This Court need not address the merits of this issue as
defendant has not preserved the issue for appellate review.

Utah

R. Crim. P. 19(c) (requiring that the grounds of any objection to
jury instructions be stated with specificity); State v. Singh,
819 P.2d 356, 360 n.2 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 832 P.2d
476 (Utah 1992); State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah App.
1991); State v. Becker, 803 P.2d 1290, 1293 (Utah App. 1990).
Defendant recognizes that there was no objection to the
instructions below on the basis that they allowed conviction for
a non-existent offense (Br. of App. at 12-13 & n.4).

He urges

this Court to reach the merits of this claim because of the
manifest injustice inherent in a conviction for a Mcrime" which
does not exist (.Id. at 12-13).
When reviewing an allegation of instructional error for
manifest injustice as provided in rule 19(c), Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, an appellate court uses the same two-prong
test used to identify the existence of plain error under rule
103(d), Utah Rules of Evidence.
121-22 (Utah 1989).

State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116,

First, the court must determine from the

record "'that it should have been obvious to a trial court that
it was committing error.'"

JEd. at 122 (quoting State v.

Eldredae, 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah 1987), cert, denied,493 U.S. 814
(1989)); see also State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah
App. 1991).

Second, the error must be harmful in that it affects
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the substantial rights of the accused.

Archambeau, 820 P.2d at

922; Verde, 770 P.2d at 122; see also State v. Archuleta, 209
Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 18 (Utah Mar. 25, 1993).
Assuming, arguendo, that the attempt section of the
assault statute requires more than reckless conduct (see Point I,
supra), and that the court's refusal to instruct the jury
accordingly constituted obvious error under the first prong of
the plain error test, reversal would not be warranted because the
record does not reflect that the error affected defendant's
substantial rights as required by the second prong of the test.
In light of defendant's admission that he performed a completed
act causing bodily injury, the jury had no evidentiary basis on
which to premise the assault on the attempt section of the
assault statute.

See Point I, supra.

Neither is there any

factual basis in this record for a finding of recklessness in the
commission of the assault.

JId.

It is clear that the court's

instruction, relating to the mental state required for an attempt
under the assault statute, even assuming it was erroneous, could
not have affected the jury's verdict in this case.

Because

defendant could not have been convicted of attempting a reckless
act, his substantial rights were not affected by the error and
his argument must fail.

Cf. Archuleta, 209 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18-

19 (finding harmless an obvious error in the trial court's
inclusion of an improper aggravating circumstance because it did
not affect defendant's substantial rights in either the guilt or
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the penalty phase of his trial where the circumstance was not
necessary to his conviction or sentence).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully
requests that this Court affirm defendant's conviction and
sentence.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this rpIS

day of April, 1993.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorn^
^

icRIS C. LEONARD
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

INSTRUCTION NO.

* ^

Before you can convict the defendant, Francisco Tinoco, of
the offense of Aggravated Assault, a lesser included offense of
Count

I of

the

Information,

you must

have

found

that

the

evidence fails to establish one or more of the elements of
Attempted Criminal Homicide, Murder beyond a reasonable doubt,
and you must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt,
each and every one of the following elements of that offense:
1.
Lake

That on or about the 21st day of April of 1992 in Salt

County,

State

of Utah,

the

defendant

Francisco

Tinoco

assaulted Jesus Rodriguez; and
2.

That he did so by the use of a dangerous weapon or

other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily
injury;
3.

That

the

said

defendant

did

so

recklessly,

intentionally or knowingly; and
4.

That the defendant did so unlawfully and without legal

justification.
If, after careful consideration of all the evidence in this
case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one of
the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must
find that the defendant guilty of the offense of Aggravated
Assault,

a

information.

lesser

included

offense

of

If, on the other hand, you

Count

I

are not

of

the

convinced

beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the foregoing
elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty of Count I.

INSTRUCTION NO,

^*

"Assault11 is:
(a)

an attempt, with unlawful force or violence,

to do bodily injury to another; or
(b)

a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate

force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; or
(c)

an

act,

committed

with

unlawful

force

or

violence, that causes bodily injury to another.
"Bodily

injury"

means

physical

pain,

illness

or

an

impairment of physical condition.
"Dangerous weapon" means any item capable of causing death
or serious bodily injury, or a facsimile or representation of the
item, and:
(a)
the item

the actor1 s use or apparent intended use of
leads the victim to reasonably

believe the

item is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury;
or
(b)

the actor represents to the victim verbally

or in any other manner that the actor is in control of
such an item.
"Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or
causes

serious

impairment

permanent

disfigurement,

protracted

of the function of any bodily member

loss

or

or organ, or

creates a substantial risk of death.
"Unlawful or unlawfully" means that which is contrary to law
or unauthorized

by

law,

or, without

legal

justification,

or,

illegal.

01

here trying to calculate.

If we go right through from

here without breaking for lunch, what time it will be
before anyone gets lunch.

I guess it will be about two

o'clock.
THE COURT:
you eat.

It would be two o'clock before

Go in and talk about it for a minute, folks.

All right.

Counsel, I'm going to need to see you in

chambers, regardless of what the jury decides to do.
All right.

We'll be in recess.
(a recess was taken)

THE COURT:

We continue in State of Utah

versus Francisco Tinoco.

The record will reflect that

counsel are present, defendant's present, the jury has
not yet return to the courtroom, and I've asked them to
remain in the jury room so that you can take your formal
exceptions, counsel.

The record should reflect that

we've discussed the instructions that will be given, as
well as discussed each one of the requested instructions,
and I heard from counsel with regard to any difficulties,
or legal positions that may be — may have been offered,
but I think it's appropriate that you have an opportunity
to take your formal exceptions prior to the jury being
instructed.

State have any formal exceptions for the

record?
MS. BYRNE:

I don't believe so, Your Honor.
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1

I was just looking for the elements instruction on

2

criminal homicide, but I do not have any exceptions to

3

the way the Court has decided to include or not include

4

the instructions.

5

THE COURT:

Ms. Remal?

6

MS. REMAL:

Your Honor, I have two exceptions

7

to make to the instructions, those are two instructions,

8

numbers twenty-three and twenty-four.

9

based on my belief that subsection A of the assault

My exception is

10

definition contained in instruction number twenty-four

11

should by law contain an indication that that requires

12

intentional conduct.

13

Court in order to accomplish that was to insert the word

14

intentionally between to and do, so that it would read

15

an attempt with unlawful force or violence to

16

intentionally do bodily injury to another.

17

And the suggestion I made to the

in concert with that, it was my suggestion that

18

element number three of the elements of aggravated

19

assault, instruction number twenty-three, have the phrase

20

added to it, whichever is applicable, so that element

21

number three would read that the said defendant did so

22

recklessly, intentionally, or knowingly, whichever is

23

applicable.

24

previously discussed, the case law which talks about what

25

kind of intent is required for any attempted offense is

My reasoning for that is that as we
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1

that it's required that it be a specific intent type of

2

offense. And so because the subsection A definition of

3

assault is an attempt, it's my belief that that requires

4

a specific intent of intentionally doing bodily injury to

5

another.

6

those two instructions.

7

And for those reasons I take exceptions to

THE COURT:

Very good.

Exceptions are noted.

8

Anything else before I bring the jury back in, counsel

9

and instruct them in the fashion that I've suggested?

10

MS. BYRNE:

No.

11

MS. REMAL:

No.

12

THE COURT:

Bring them in.

13

(Jury returned to the courtroom.)

14

THE COURT:

Counsel, please be seated.

The

15

record will show the jury has returned to the courtroom.

16

Ladies and gentlemen, the instructions that I spoke of

17

earlier have now been completed.

18

reviewed the law and the facts that apply to this case,

19

and have prepared instructions that I hope will encompass

20

all the information that you will need to reach a just, a

21

fair, and a lawful verdict in this case.

22

law before closing argument to read the instructions to

23

the jury.

24

—

25

take with you into the jury room should you choose to

Counsel and I have

The jury is orally charged.

I'm required by

And you will have

however, you will have the written instructions to
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ADDENDUM B

76-4-101

INCHOATE OFFENSES

CHAPTER 4
INCHOATE OFFENSES
Part 1
Attempt

^Section
'76^202-

Section
76-4-101.
76-4-102.

Attempt — Elements of offense.
Attempt — Classification of offenaes
Part 2
^
* , r*
*
Criminal Conspiracy
76-4-201. Conspiracy — Elements of offense.

Conspiracy — Classification of offenses.
Part 3

Exemptions and Restrictions
76-4-301. Specific attempt or conspiracy offense prevails.
76-4-302. Conviction of inchoate and principal offense or attempt and conspiracy to commit offense prohibited.

PART 1
ATTEMPT
76-4-101. Attempt — Elements of offense.
(1) For purposes of this part a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a
crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of the offense, he engages in conduct constituting a substantial step
toward commission of the offense.
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not constitute a substantial step
unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to commit the offense.
(3) No defense to the offense of attempt shall arise:
(a) Because the offense attempted was actually committed; or
(b) Due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could have been
committed had the attendant circumstances been as the actor believed
them to be.
History: C. 1953, 76-4-101, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, t 76-4-101.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Attempted murder.
Attempt to receive stolen property.
Campaign contributions.
Common-law rule superseded.
Completed offense.
Culpability.
Instructions.
Intent.
Overt act.
Cited.
Constitutionality.
Preclusion of the defense of impossibility by

this section does not violate the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. State v.
Sommers, 569 P.2d 1110 (Utah 1977).
Attempted murder.
The crime of attempted murder requires
proof of intent to kill. Attempted murder does
not fit within the felony-murder doctrine because an attempt to commit a crime requires
proof of an intent to consummate the crime.
Therefore, it follows that attempted felonymurder does not exist as a crime in Utah. State
v. Bell, 122 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (1989).
Attempt to receive stolen property.
Where defendant purchased property with
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